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Abstract
The concept of electromagnetic hazards is today frequently taken to refer to direct effects on biological tissue.
However, several other effects are possible and have been the subject of a substantial amount of research in
earlier decades. One of these is the hazard of ignition of flammable gas/vapor mixtures due to sparks resulting
from radiofrequency currents flowing in metallic structures. Although the physics of the mechanism linking
power from a radio transmitter to ignition of a flammable mixture is relatively straightforward, compared with
bioelectromagnetic effects, there are many uncertainties and poorly-understood steps in the process, leading
to considerable difficulties for committees tasked with setting safety limits. The author has experience of such
committees, notably that concerned with British Standard 6656, and the way in which these difficulties were
addressed may give useful insights for the regulation of other hazards.
Keywords
electromagnetic hazards, radiofrequency currents, flammable gas/vapor mixtures, British Standard 6656,
safety limits
Disciplines
Computational Engineering | Computer Sciences
Comments
©2002 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this
material for advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or
redistribution to servers or lists, or to reuse any copyrighted component of this work in other works must be
obtained from the IEEE. This material is presented to ensure timely dissemination of scholarly and technical
work. Copyright and all rights therein are retained by authors or by other copyright holders. All persons
copying this information are expected to adhere to the terms and constraints invoked by each author's
copyright. In most cases, these works may not be reposted without the explicit permission of the copyright
holder. The paper was published by IEEE Technology and Society Magazine in 2002 and was sponsored by
IEEE Society on Social Implications of Technology. The definitive version is available at
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org
This article is available at Glyndŵr University Research Online: http://epubs.glyndwr.ac.uk/cair/17
CHOOSING THRESHOLD LEVELSFor Electromagnetic Hazards
Peter S. Excell
32 IEEE Technology and Society Magazine, Winter 2002/20030278-0079/02/$17.00©2002IEEE
©
DI
G
IT
AL
 V
IS
IO
N
ecell.qxd  12/24/02  2:18 PM  Page 32
Authorized licensed use limited to: Peter Excell. Downloaded on January 25, 2010 at 12:45 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
The concept of “electromag-netic hazards” is today fre-quently taken to refer todirect effects on biologicaltissue. However, severalother effects are possible
and have been the subject of a sub-
stantial amount of research in earli-
er decades. One of these is the haz-
ard of ignition of flammable
gas/vapor mixtures due to sparks
resulting from radio frequency cur-
rents flowing in metallic structures.
Although the physics of the mech-
anism linking power from a radio
transmitter to ignition of a flamma-
ble mixture is relatively straight-
forward, compared with bioelec-
tromagnetic effects, there are many
uncertainties and poorly-under-
stood steps in the process, leading
to considerable difficulties for
committees tasked with setting
safety limits. The author has expe-
rience of such committees, notably
that concerned with British Stan-
dard 6656 [1], and the way in
which these difficulties were
addressed may give useful insights
for the regulation of other hazards.
MECHANISM OF THE HAZARD
Radio transmitters radiate pow-
er into their environment in the
form of electromagnetic fields. In
the intended mode of functioning,
these fields interact with metallic
receiving antennas, generating cur-
rents in the desired band of fre-
quencies. These currents, which
are extremely weak in typical cas-
es, can then be amplified and
demodulated in suitable electronic
circuits such that the desired audio,
video or data information is recre-
ated in baseband form. 
The electromagnetic fields can-
not distinguish between a receiving
antenna and any other metallic
structure, and hence radio frequen-
cy currents are induced in all
metallic structures encountered in
the propagation of the radiated
waves. Relatively close to a trans-
mitter, these currents can be rela-
tively strong and they can lead to
substantial voltages at terminating
ends and discontinuities in the
metallic structures. Clearly, in
extreme cases, a sufficiently high
voltage may be generated such that
a spark could jump a gap between
two metallic structures. In practice,
this requires such high power that
it is only viable extremely close to
powerful transmitters. A much
more significant mechanism for the
production sparks is the so-called
“break spark,” in which some form
of opening contact occurs within
the metallic structure or between
two separate structures that are ini-
tially in contact. This mechanism
allows the spark to be started with
a relatively small voltage, creating
an initial plasma which can then be
expanded as the metallic parts are
drawn apart. 
If the spark is surrounded adven-
titiously by a flammable gas/air mix-
ture there is the possibility that the
mixture may be ignited and cause an
explosion. This is obviously a matter
of serious concern, although it will
only occur if the gas/air ratio is with-
in a known range of values and the
power generated in the spark is
above a known threshold. Although
very few incidents of explosions
caused by his mechanism have ever
been recorded, it is physically obvi-
ous that the mechanism is entirely
possible and hence it became a
source of major concern to military
authorities, and later to the oil and
gas industries. Military concerns
were predominantly focused on the
potential for ignition during the refu-
eling of aircraft, especially on the
deck of an aircraft carrier, where
there are many relatively high power
radio transmitters close to an aircraft
on the deck. Concern in the oil and
gas industries was greatly boosted
when offshore fields began to be
developed. Offshore exploration and
production platforms have to carry a
wide range of radio transmitters
radiating moderately high powers,
but they are located very close to
potential sources of flammable
gas/air mixture production. It is also
pertinent to note that the density of
investment and personnel on an 
offshore platform means that the
basic financial risk involved is very
high, and this is augmented many
times over by the potential cost of
the loss of production if an accident
were to occur. 
The basic physical mechanism
involves radiation of power from a
transmitter, propagation through
space, and reception by a metallic
structure acting as an unintended
receiving antenna (URA). This
basic mechanism is summarized in
the Friis transmission formula:
(1)
Where PT is the power radiated
by the transmitting antenna, PR is
the power available to a matched
load at the receiving antenna
(URA), GT is the gain of the trans-
mitting antenna, GR is the gain of
the URA, l is the wavelength and r
is the distance between the trans-
mitting antenna and the URA. 
Of these variables, most are well
established, but GR and the limiting
safe value of PR are problematic.
After a lengthy period of debate
and experimentation, it was found
that limiting maximum safe values
of power dissipated in a spark could
be specified for a range of the most
common flammable mixtures.
These mixtures have to be assumed
to be in admixture with normal air
(pure oxygen, for instance, greatly
reduces the threshold for ignition)
and three broad classes of common
flammables are defined, as had pre-
viously been found in experiments
to find limiting values of pulsed
ignition energy from transient (e.g.,
electrostatic) sparks. The flamma-
ble substance are divided into
‘Groups’, having broadly similar
minimum ignition energies (MIEs):
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Group I is a special category for
natural gas released in coal mines
(‘firedamp’); Group IIA covers
most common gaseous or vaporiz-
able flammables, especially the sat-
urated hydrocarbons (alkanes);
Group IIB gases have lower MIEs,
the only common example being
ethylene (ethene; but note that it is
by no means the case that all
alkenes fall into this group); Group
IIC covers substances with the low-
est MIEs, which are hydrogen,
acetylene, carbon disulphide and a
few other exotic substances [1]. 
The physics determining the
spark ignition power threshold is
complex. Ignition requires a self-
sustaining flame front to be devel-
oped in the flammable mixture and,
if the incipient ignition is regarded
as a spherical fireball, it can be visu-
alized that a spark with an energy
below the ignition threshold (MIE)
will cause some combustion in its
spark channel but that the fireball
will be so small that, as it expands, it
cools more rapidly than heat is
gained by the exothermic combus-
tion reaction. Thus, a sufficient ini-
tial burst of electrical heat is
required to augment the combustion
reaction such that the fireball
remains hot enough to cause contin-
uing combustion at its outer surface
until it has grown suf-
ficiently large to be
self-sustaining. Stud-
ies of this mechanism
were conducted exten-
sively with pulsed (dc)
sparks and these eluci-
dated the behavior of
the different flamma-
ble mixture groups,
although the mecha-
nism, and the reasons
for the differing MIEs,
are still not fully
understood. Relating
this work to sparks
caused by continuous-
ly available radio fre-
quency power caused
considerable difficul-
ties. It was realised at
an early stage that a spark between a
fixed electrode gap would require an
improbably high voltage unless the
electrodes were extremely close
together, in which case they would
cause quenching of the expanding
flame front and hence suppression
of the self-sustaining reaction. It had
been discovered in experiments on
explosion safety of dc and power
frequency equipment that the most
severe condition was the so-called
break spark, in which conductors
initially in contact were pulled apart,
at least one of them with a sprung
“flicking” motion such that a spark
could be struck with a very low
source voltage at the instant of
breaking, but then the flicking of the
electrode removed its quenching
action from the flame front [2].
The extensive work at dc and
power frequencies had not, howev-
er, been quantified in terms of pow-
er, as was the most logical parame-
ter for radio frequency situations. It
was concluded that new experi-
ments with radio frequency sources
were needed, and several groups
modified the existing break spark
test equipment to reduce its capaci-
tive loading effect on radio frequen-
cy sources: experiments were than
undertaken over a range of frequen-
cies to determine whether these had
an influence on the power required
for ignition. Early experiments
were undertaken with 50-W source
impedances, as seemed a logical
choice, but the results showed
somewhat surprisingly high powers
to be required and an unexplained
frequency dependence [3], [4]. 
A landmark experiment at the
British Navy’s Admiralty Surface
Weapons Establishment showed
that ignition could be caused with
far lower powers if the source
impedance were made much higher
than 50 W, such that the voltage
available for a given power was
greatly augmented. The higher
source voltage enabled the spark to
continue burning for a longer peri-
od as the electrodes separated, thus
allowing more energy to be
dumped into the transient spark and
also enabling the quenching effect
of the electrodes to be removed.
Following this, some new series of
quantitative experiments with high
source impedances were undertak-
en and it was found that the power
required for ignition was much
lower than with 50-W sources and
was now essentially independent of
frequency [5]. A set of powers for
the three flammability classes was
determined by experiment (Table I)
and these are now universally
accepted, although the physical
connection between these powers
and the energies required for igni-
tion is still very complex and not
fully understood, especially since
the match condition between the
spark and the radio frequency
source is changing continuously
during the spark process. 
It may be noted that, for pulsed
radars, an energy based criterion
can still be used, since the spark can
safely be assumed to be caused by a
single pulse. Nonetheless, the use of
the energies determined in dc exper-
iments leads to difficulties (see
below) and hence higher values are
used in current safety standards. 
The issue of the gain of the URA
poses still greater difficulties. In ini-
tial work, the groups developing
Offshore exploration and production
platforms have to carry a wide range of
radio transmitters radiating moderately
high powers, but they are located very
close to potential sources of flammable
gas/air mixture production.
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safety standards presumed that a
gain of around 1.5 was reasonable,
since this is the value for an electri-
cally small dipole or loop antenna,
and the value for a half wavelength
dipole antenna is not greatly differ-
ent (1.64). However, use of this val-
ue leads to the prediction of the
potential for explosions at improba-
bly large distances from the trans-
mitter at low frequencies. For exam-
ple, if the case of a typical AM radio
transmitter is considered (ignoring
ground losses, which have a signifi-
cant but not overwhelming effect)
the Friis transmission formula may
be rearranged to give a minimum
safe distance from the transmitter
for establishments handling flam-
mable mixtures:
(2)
Taking realistic values of PT =
200 kW, GT = 5 (e.g., for an anti-
fading monopole antenna), l = 300
m (i.e., 1MHz) and PR = 8 W (the
value found for the most common
flammable substances), then (2)
predicts a minimum safe distance
from the transmitter of 10.3 km
(larger if modulation is taken into
account). This is plainly ridiculous,
since it would suggest that the large
number of (for example) gasoline
filling stations that have survived
for many years around such trans-
mitters at closer distances should
have been the scenes of many trag-
ic explosions. 
In fact, only two fires or explo-
sions are known to have occurred
which have definitely been
ascribed to radio frequency ignition
[6], although several more
instances of potentially hazardous
sparking have been observed in sit-
uations where there was fortunate-
ly no flammable mixture. The fact
that hardly any such explosions
have occurred implies a need to re-
examine the physics. Certainly
propagation losses can be added to
the model and they give some
reduction in the predicted power
appearing in the URA, but this
effect is modest at the relatively
short distances concerned. It was
then noticed that receiving antenna
efficiency had necessarily to be
taken into account since use of the
simplistic gain value of the order of
1.5 would lead to quite ridiculous
predictions at very low frequencies.
The fundamental difference in effi-
ciency between electrically small
and electrically large antennas thus
had to be invoked, electrically
small URAs being dominated by
their low efficiency, causing a
much reduced value of gain. In
quantifying this, the concept of the
“reasonable worst case (RWC)
assumption” becomes important,
although it was a guiding principle
in all considerations of safety stan-
dards for this hazard mechanism. 
Clearly, in improbably exotic
cases, one might postulate the exis-
tence of (for example) huge para-
bolic reflectors, supergain anten-
nas, or highly efficient antennas
using superconductors. Certainly
the latter two of these can be dis-
missed as being completely ridicu-
lous in a URA. The possibility of
an adventitiously occurring reflec-
tor is not quite impossible, but
“engineering judgment” concluded
that it was so improbable that it
could be ruled out. This decision,
however, illustrates the introduc-
tion of a subjective element in deci-
sions on safety thresholds.
Further such decisions had to be
taken in deriving formulas for the
RWC efficiency of electrically
small URAs. The loop antenna was
first chosen as the canonical exam-
ple, since it can be constituted by a
continuous metallic structure (e.g.,
a crane on a metallic deck), where-
as a dipole-like structure requires an
elevated insulated metallic conduc-
tor. The probable value for loss
resistance in the loop antenna then
had to be derived, by assuming that
it was made of steel, and hence had
substantially more loss than copper,
and choosing a range of representa-
tive values for its effective cross-
sectional diameter. The inclusion of
the efficiency completely changed
the frequency characteristic of the
Friis formula: if efficiency is not
considered, this gives a received
power that is proportional to f -2.
However, a detailed analysis of the
efficiency of the loop antenna
shows that it is proportional to f 3.5,
thus giving an overall dependence
on f 1.5 [7]. The rather surprising 
f 3.5 dependence follows from the
facts that the radiation resistance of
a loop antenna is proportional to f 4,
but the ohmic resistance of the con-
ductors, as modified by the skin
effect, is proportional to ÷f, and the
efficiency is proportional to their
ratio when the loss is dominant.
This modification eliminates the
problem of improbably high
received powers at low frequencies,
but it introduces the issue of
cost/benefit trade-offs in deciding
what is a realistic hazard. Clearly,
no one could realistically argue that
the antenna might be made of super-
conductor or silver, but the possibil-
ity of its construction from copper
or aluminium rather than steel obvi-
ously has a nonzero probability. It
was found, however, that the use of
the parameters for steel gave output
powers from a URA that were still
about three times larger than were
found in experimental measure-
ments and hence it was concluded
that the use of the steel formula con-
tained sufficient safety factors to
cover for rare cases of structures
with higher conductivity. 
Another variable factor that was
considered was the polarization
match of the loop antenna to the
incident radiation. A vertical loop
such as a crane is polarization-
matched to incident vertically-polar-
ized radiation when the plane of the
loop is normal to the direction of the
(horizontal) magnetic field vector.
Clearly, the probability of achieving
perfect polarization match is very
small, but given the shape of the field
pattern of such an antenna, the polar-
ization matching factor (for power)
will be between 0.5 and 1.0 for 50%
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of possible orientation angles, and
hence a worst-case assumption that
it is always 1.0 is not unreasonable. 
The electrically small loop
antenna is inherently inductive and
needs to be resonated with a tuning
capacitance if it is to act as a rea-
sonably effective antenna. Here,
much more engineering judgement
had to be applied. Taking the crane
as the canonical RWC example, it
was reasoned that it could be lifting
a metallic load from a metallic sur-
face (e.g., the deck of an offshore
platform), and hence a parasitic
capacitance could be formed that
would cause the antenna to pass
through the tuned condition: a trail-
ing wire from the load could then
cause a break spark event. An alter-
native line of argument might have
been to say that the possibility of
such tuning was too improbable
and that the antenna should always
be regarded as untuned. This view
was not taken by the relevant com-
mittee, but this illustrates the arbi-
trariness of many decisions based
on engineering judgement. 
For electrically large antennas
the possibility of near-unity effi-
ciency is very high, since the radia-
tion resistance is relatively large.
Unity efficiency was thus assumed,
but a different problem arises in the
choice of the value of gain. A deci-
sion on this was reached on the
basis of judgement following a
study of electrically long dipole
antennas [8]. Studying the enve-
lope of the graphs of maximum
directivity as a wire dipole antenna
was extended in length, it was not-
ed that the gradient of this envelope
declines somewhat for longer
lengths such that it was considered
that a value of 10 for the maximum
gain was a reasonable choice, bear-
ing in mind that the width of the
(axisymmetric) main lobe would
be relatively small, making orienta-
tion critical, and hence the proba-
bility of optimum orientation
small. Note, however, that this rea-
soning is based on qualitative
assessments of probabilities.
Outside of electrical considera-
tions, a major effect contributing to
a low rate of explosions is the sim-
ple fact that flammable atmos-
pheres are not normally present,
and only occur when some fault sit-
uation has developed. This situa-
tion has a very low probability of
occurrence, but committees have
generally felt obliged to take the
probability as unity.
Another non-electrical consider-
ation is the probability of occur-
rence of the breaking contact: again,
committees have assigned this an
effective value of unity, although
realistic values are far smaller.
The large number of concatenat-
ed worst-case judgements taken by
consensus of the committees is not
very satisfactory from a philosoph-
ical standpoint. The judgements
were made on a subjective and
qualitative basis, and the possibili-
ty of error in them would be diffi-
cult to rule out. Due to the fact that
a limited range of measurements
showed that measured received
powers were still substantially low-
er than those found from theoreti-
cal predictions, no safety factors
were included in the treatment,
despite this normally being the
case in safety standards.
A particular problem occurred
with the power received from
pulsed radars. Ideally the energy in
the pulse at the safe limit should be
similar to the energy in well-estab-
lished dc spark ignition studies,
and this had been shown to be the
case in laboratory conditions [9].
However, using this value led to
implausibly large diameters of haz-
ard zones around radar antennas.
To overcome this, a series of exper-
iments were undertaken which
showed that far less induced power
was found and hence the level of
ignition power deemed to be haz-
ardous was somewhat arbitrarily
increased to a substantially higher
value in order to reduce the diame-
ter of the ‘at risk’ zone [10]. The
rationale for this was that the break
spark mechanism would absorb
some of the energy and quench part
of the flame front, but the experi-
ments on which this was based
were far from comprehensive.
Particular complexities arise
where multiple overlaid transmis-
sions at different frequencies are
considered. This then begs the ques-
tion whether they should be added in
voltage or power terms and whether
the antenna should be considered to
be tuned to one of them and detuned
with respect to others. Power addi-
tion and a limited attenuation of
untuned frequencies were adopted in
[1], using a complex formula based
on further RWC treatments.
Matters become even more
complicated when mobile transmit-
ters are considered. This was vivid-
ly illustrated in assessments of pos-
sible hazards on offshore drilling
platforms. Such platforms may
have many tens of VHF or UHF
walkie-talkies, typically radiating
of the order of 1 W. The hypotheti-
cal question must then be asked
“supposing that 20 or more of these
walkie-talkies were brought
together and keyed simultaneously,
could they induce enough power in
a URA to cause an ignition?” This
raises further questions, such as the
possibility of them all operating on
the same frequency simultaneously
and the effect of the mutual cou-
pling on mismatch at the power
amplifiers. It appears virtually
impossible for them to add coher-
ently, but incoherent (power based)
addition at closely spaced frequen-
cies looks entirely possible. How-
ever, it is very clear that a balance
has to be struck between the tiny
risk of multiple adjacent operation
of these transmitters against the
importance of having such trans-
mitters available widely dispersed
around the platform, since the pos-
sibility of some more normal acci-
dent has a much higher probability
and the walkie-talkies are the ideal
means of reporting such an acci-
dent so that an immediate response
can be initiated. This issue is also a
matter of concern for the safety of
36 IEEE Technology and Society Magazine, Winter 2002/2003
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electroexplosive detonators on off-
shore platforms [11]. 
Modulation of the waveform
does not cause great problems. The
dc experiments have shown that
there is a “critical time” within
which the energy must be delivered
if it is to have maximum effect. If it
is delivered more slowly, then addi-
tional energy is required to cause
ignition, due to thermal loss from
the fireball. Typical critical times
are: 200 ms for Group IIA, 100 ms
for Group IIB, and 20 ms for
Group IIC. The RWC view means
that amplitude modulated wave-
forms that have a lowest-order peri-
odicity that is equal to or greater
than these times must be assessed
at the modulation peak. For others,
such as FM, the mean power can be
used. Pulsed radars are exceptions,
and they can be handled on a pulse
energy basis, as discussed above. 
The issue of possible intensifica-
tion of the incident field by reflec-
tion and focusing has been briefly
mentioned above in the context of
improbable parabolic reflectors.
However, other reflection-intensifi-
cation scenarios are possible which
are less improbable. For instance,
reflection by a single metallic sheet
will cause a standing wave that will
give a 6-dB intensification of the
electric field strength, but does this
equate to an amplification of the
available power by four times, or
will the output impedance of the
URA be modified by coupling to its
image in reflecting surface? Almost
equally likely is the possibility of
occurrence of a “corner reflector”
structure, formed by a 90∞ concave
angle between conducting plates.
This is a well-known structure in
antenna design, giving a gain of
about 12 dBi [12]. This is a simple
structure which will occur quite
commonly in the real world and
which cannot be dismissed as
improbable, unlike the parabolic
reflector. A worse-case view might
argue that this structure is realisti-
cally quite likely to occur and hence
that the possibility of a ten times
power amplification should be
allowed for (i.e., 12 dBi minus the
gain of the basic loop antenna,
which is approximately 2 dBi).
However, in practice this again
leads to unrealistically large zones
of risk and, since little evidence of
the effect was found in practice, the
committee decision was not to
allow for any enhancement due to
reflections in theoretical treatments.
DISCUSSION OF THE
ETHICAL ISSUES
Clearly, those charged with the
responsibility for drafting safety
standards to protect against the
possibility of occurrence of haz-
ards of this nature have “people’s
lives in their hands.” Conventional-
ly, these matters are decided by
committees, of which the present
author has been a member of a
number in the U.K. His task was
frequently to present the physical
arguments to the committee, but
equally he understood the pragmat-
ic difficulty that very few real acci-
dents of this type have occurred in
the past and that an over-emphasis
on safety could cause unjustifiable
restraints on communications sys-
tems which might either be an
important factor in the safety of
individuals or that performed a
valuable service in society, and
whose loss might be a detriment
that society would wish to balance
against acceptance of a very small
level of risk. 
These dilemmas are not new. In
the nuclear and chemical industries,
in particular, there has long been a
realization that absolute safety is
impossible to achieve, except by
closing down the industry com-
pletely. In these cases, a very
sophisticated level of analysis has
been applied in an attempt to quan-
tify the probability of occurrence of
all accident mechanisms that can be
envisaged [13]. Where necessary,
steps are then taken to modify
processes in order to reduce these
probabilities below an acceptable
threshold. The threshold of accept-
ability is basically determined by
risks that the public deems accept-
able, multiplied by a safety factor.
For many years, the norms for
acceptable risk have been the rate of
death by disease, which has been
similar to the rate of death in road
accidents (excluding motorcycles,
which are significantly more haz-
ardous). Figures vary, but a fatality
rate of around one death per 10 000
person-years is a typical figure. The
philosophy of the hazardous indus-
tries is then to demonstrate that the
probability of death due to their
processes (the fatal accident rate,
FAR) is essentially “in the noise”
compared with these accepted risks,
so a FAR of about 1000 times low-
er is considered a reasonable target,
although figures vary.
Whether this is a moral approach
is effectively a matter for political
decision. Clearly, if the disease
and/or road accident rates death
rates could be significantly reduced
then this would bring industrial haz-
ards up to a higher level of signifi-
cance and could put some onus on
the proprietors of such businesses to
spend more funds to reduce their
predicted FAR. Conversely, FAR
arguments can also justifiably be
used to inhibit excessive spending
on very small risks, using the argu-
ment that the resources could be
better spent on road safety improve-
ments, medical research, building
more hospitals, etc. 
Applying these concepts to elec-
tromagnetic ignition hazards, there
is at present a lack of a complete
probabilistic analysis of the occur-
rence of a hazard, although some
efforts have been made to initiate
the work [14]-[16]. In fact, in the
language used above, many phe-
nomena were deemed to be either
so improbable as to be negligible,
or alternatively reasonably probable
within a worst-case scenario, but all
of these decisions were made by
use of professional engineering
judgement by members of commit-
tees and almost no rigorous mathe-
matical analysis of probabilities
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was undertaken. In fact, much the
same can be said of the wide gener-
ality of electromagnetic compatibil-
ity problems, almost all of which
are still assessed on a rather crude
deterministic go/no-go approach
using engineering judgement.
Many such effects can be just as
safety-critical as explosion hazards,
but with a higher level of probabili-
ty of occurrence, e.g., interference
in vehicle anti-lock braking and
engine management systems; inter-
ference to aircraft control systems;
interference to electrical control
systems in safety-critical chemical
and nuclear plants. 
Consideration of the probabilis-
tic hazards-analysis approach
implies that many electromagnetic
compatibility/hazards effects should
ideally be considered to be reliabili-
ty problems, in which an unwant-
ed/hazardous event corresponds to a
“failure,” exactly like failure of a
transistor gate in a safety-critical
electronic system. Inasmuch as reli-
ability theory is quite highly devel-
oped in a probabilistic form, it may
be said that electromagnetic com-
patibility and electromagnetic haz-
ards analyses are significantly defi-
cient and rather crude, and that
conversion to a probabilistic basis
appears to be a highly desirable
development for the future.
LEGAL AND
ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS
Electromagnetic radiation for
communications is probably
unique, in that it is an environmen-
tal disturbance that is broadcast out-
side the perimeter of its originator’s
site as a necessary part of its func-
tion. It undoubtedly has the poten-
tial to cause certain types of hazard
(if only in rare circumstances), and
yet the victims of any possible acci-
dent do not appear to have any
direct means for redress against the
broadcaster or the national radio
regulation authorities (certainly not
in the English legal system, and it is
believed that this is generally the
case). This observation is offered
purely as a matter of interest, not as
an indication of a deficiency need-
ing to be rectified; nonetheless, it is
a point that may merit further con-
sideration, since there seem to be
significant points of difference
with, for instance, electricity and
water supply utilities, sound, or
environmental pollutants.
RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER
HAZARDS
Another form of potential elec-
tromagnetic hazard that has not yet
been mentioned is that of the direct
action of electromagnetic fields on
human tissue. This has some simi-
larity with the electromagnetic
ignition hazard, but obviously dif-
fers in the nature of the “receiver.”
Much the same considerations
apply to the transmitted power and
the propagation path, although
those parameters are essentially
deterministic and uncontroversial.
The issues of intensification of the
incident field due to reflection and
focusing are largely identical: it is
noteworthy that these seem to have
been rarely discussed in the bio-
electromagnetics context, although
some studies are known to have
considered intensification of the
field due to reflection from the sur-
faces of buildings [17].
The mechanism in the “receiver”
is very different, since human tissue
does not really behave in any close
analogy with a receiving antenna.
For the well-understood thermal
hazard, there is a relatively well
understood deterministic connection
between the input field strength and
the maximum specific absorption
rate (SAR), although this certainly
will have an orientation dependence
which has not been investigated in
great detail, due to the application of
the RWC principle, in which only a
realistic worst case orientation is
normally considered. 
For the putative non-thermal
effects, the biophysics at present
admits very little scope for expla-
nation of any mechanism, although
researchers continue to look for the
possibility of subtle effects. It thus
becomes difficult to apply either
deterministic or probabilistic
approaches to the setting of safety
standards and this is the case where
the “precautionary principle” has
been invoked by several bodies, to
suggest that a certain limits should
be placed on SAR, “just in case” a
hazard mechanism might be dis-
covered in the future. Work to try to
discover a clear-cut, generally-
agreed mechanism continues, but it
is unlikely but there will be any
consensus on this, positive or nega-
tive, for some years yet. 
Consideration of the probabilis-
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TABLE I
MINIMUM IGNITION ENERGIES (MIE) AND RF IGNITION POWERS FOR COMMON FLAMMABLES
MIE Group MIE RF ignition power Radar MIE (µJ), as
(µJ) (W) given in [1]
IIA (e.g. methane, propane, butane, 200 - 280 6 950
gasoline vapour, benzene, acetone)
IIB (e.g. ethylene, acrylonitrile, ~100 3.5 250
diethyl ether, hydrogen cyanide, coal gas)
IIC (e.g. hydrogen, acetylene, carbon disulphide) ~20 2 50
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tic approaches to reliability and
hazards assessment in inherently
potentially dangerous industries
suggests that there might be some
utility in examining an approach in
which it would be assumed, as tem-
porary postulate, that some kind of
non-thermal mechanism had been
discovered and agreed upon but that
its probability of causing a signifi-
cant problem is extremely low. In
the absence of knowledge about
such a mechanism, would it then be
possible to postulate two models
(threshold-type and dose-response
related) and assess the probability
of occurrence of a problem which
could then be compared with
accepted low-probability occur-
rences (e.g. FAR)? This would cer-
tainly be possible in principle for
human beings existing in the sto-
chastic field environment represent-
ed by the relative position of base
stations with respect to the quasi-
random movements of a human
being in normal daily life. Howev-
er, the situation with respect to
hand-held mobile telephones is
more difficult, since the geometri-
cal aspects are essentially determin-
istic in that case and there is only a
stochastic aspect with respect to the
periods of use. Nonetheless, this
idea may be worthy of further
exploration since the limited exper-
imental evidence suggests that the
probability of occurrence of any
putative effect is likely to be
extremely low and quite possibly
well into the FAR “noise level.”
APPLICATION OF TECHNIQUE
TO BIOELECTROMAGNETIC
HAZARDS
Experience drawn from many
years of research and involvement
with standards-making bodies in
the area of electromagnetic ignition
hazards has been reviewed and an
attempt made to draw generic
lessons. Specific lessons include
the difficulty of relating physical
theory to actual experience, the
wisdom or otherwise of the use of
safety factors (analogous to the
“precautionary principle”) and the
desirability, in principle, of evaluat-
ing all hazards probabilistically, so
that they can be compared with
generally accepted hazards. It
seems likely that much work
remains to be done on probabilistic
assessment, especially in wider
aspects of electromagnetic compat-
ibility in safety-critical systems.
Application of this technique to the
issue of bioelectromagnetic haz-
ards is problematic, due to the lack
of any as-yet agreed physical
mechanism for the putative non-
thermal effects. However, it has
been a suggested that an investiga-
tion of such a probabilistic
approach, using arbitrarily postu-
lated parameters for the character-
istics of some non-thermal effect
that might be discovered in the
future, might have some utility or
yield some insights. 
The message for the precaution-
ary principle appears to be that it
should be applied with great cau-
tion. For the ignition hazard, the
fact that experience of hazardous
incidents has been far lower than
appears to be predicted by the phys-
ical theory has been used as a rea-
son for largely discarding safety
factors, and in some cases for
adopting much higher hazard
threshold levels than appear to be
indicated by physical theory. The
principle is also well established
that restriction of a beneficial tech-
nology on the basis of a weakly jus-
tified theory of a hazard mechanism
may be more damaging than toler-
ating the hazard: this relates strong-
ly to the philosophy in inherently
hazardous industries where the
achievement of total safety is fully
accepted as being impossible and
instead effort is directed towards
maintaining the risk of any severe
effects below a socially acceptable
level. If any subtle bioelectromag-
netic hazard mechanism were ever
to be discovered in the future, it is
very likely that this principle of
accepting the risk provided it could
be demonstrated to be at an
insignificantly low level would
come to be applied in due course.
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